最优阈值的增值税

最优阈值的增值税(中文2500字,英文1600字)
摘要
    增值税的主要特点之一，而且往往是最有争议的，是高水平营业额企业有义务登记税。尽管其重要性，在适当的层次上设置这个门槛这个问题已经很少得到分析的注意。本文首先建立一个简单的规则描述在权衡税收和收集信息的成本的最优阈值（当企业的规模是固定的）。然后认为，原则上其影响的最佳阈值的生产效率低下所暗示的差别待遇的上面和下面的门槛。
1 导言
    设计增值税（ VAT ）所应采取的最重要的决定是阈值水平营业额以上公司必须对他们的销项增值税负责（并有权声明他们的进项增值税） 。门槛太高妥协的基本目标是提高收入，过低的门槛有可能使当局陷入执行和实施过度纳税人遵从成本。设计问题进一步复杂化，而且，竞争与差别税收待遇扭曲了企业上面和下面的门槛。
The optimal threshold for a value-added tax
Abstract
One of the key features of a value-added tax—and often one of the most contentious—is the threshold level of turnover at which firms are obliged to register for the tax. Despite its importance, however, the question of the appropriate level at which to set this threshold has received little analytical attention. This paper first develops a simple rule characterizing the optimal threshold (when firms’ sizes are fixed) in terms of a trade-off between tax revenues and collection costs. It then considers, in principle and by simulation, the implications for the optimal threshold of the production inefficiencies implied by the differential treatment of those above and below the threshold.